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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11 (i), from a judgment and conviction for illegal possession of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996). This Court invokes jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3{2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Fanari's 
motion to suppress since Trooper Avery did not have probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. When reviewing 
a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate 
court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error, 
and its conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Stephens, 946 
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Fanari's 
motion to suppress since Trooper Avery did not have reasonable 
suspicion to extend the scope of the detention after the stop 
occurred. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, the appellate court reviews the trial court's factual 
findings for clear error, and its conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Stephens, 946 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes --
Provisions -- Traffic control devices. 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked 
lanes for traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as 
practical entirely within a single lane and 
may not be moved from the lane until the 
operator has determined the movement can be 
made safely. 
• * * * 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case stems from a traffic stop on Interstate 70 in Sevier 
County, Utah. Incident to the stop, police discovered a quantity 
of marijuana in the trunk of Fanari's rented car. After the 
preliminary hearing, Fanari filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (R. 
at 27) arguing that police violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment on two grounds. First, Fanari argued that the officer 
who initiated the traffic stop did not have probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Second, even if the officer 
was justified in stopping Fanari, the officer impermissibly 
extended the scope of the detention beyond the time necessary to 
investigate the reason for the stop. The trial court denied 
Fanari's motion to suppress. Fanari then entered a plea of guilty, 
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and pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (i) he reserved 
his right to appeal the denial of his motion. (R. at 72) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 3, 1996, Marco Fanari was travelling eastbound on 
Interstate 70 in Sevier County, Utah. The eastbound traffic was 
divided into two lanes, separated by a dotted white line. The lane 
in which Fanari was travelling had a dotted center line on the 
driver's side dividing Fanari's lane from the adjacent lane of 
travel and a solid fog line on the passenger's side. Fanari, 
driving a rented Lincoln Continental, was travelling directly 
behind an eighteen-wheel tractor trailer. Trooper Dennis Avery of 
the Utah Highway Patrol stopped the Lincoln for improper lane 
travel. (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at 4-8) [Hereinafter 
"Trans."] 
According to Trooper Avery, on this stretch of 1-70 it is 
almost always windy, and it was indeed windy when he stopped 
Fanari's Lincoln. Avery followed the Lincoln over a distance of 
about three-quarters of a mile (20 to 30 seconds) , and the trooper 
observed Fanari's car cross the fog line and move back to the 
center line. The record does not indicate how many times this 
occurred. Avery testified that before he initiated the stop he did 
not notice anything else unusual about the car or the driving 
pattern. (Trans, at 7-8, 11-12) 
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When Trooper Avery approached the Lincoln, he explained that 
he stopped Fanari because of the "weaving" in the lane. Fanari 
told the trooper that he could feel himself weaving, but thought 
that it was because of the wind. At no time thereafter did Avery 
again discuss the driving pattern with Fanari. (Trans, at 12-13) 
Avery asked Fanari for his driver's license and the rental 
papers for the car. The trooper knew the car was a rental because 
of the bar code on the back window. As Fanari was gathering the 
license and rental papers, Avery asked Fanari about his travel 
itinerary. Fanari explained that he had flown to Las Vegas to 
visit a friend and had then rented the car in Las vegas and was 
going to return it in Montrose, Colorado. Avery's attention was 
drawn to Fanari because Fanari was nervous during the traffic stop. 
(Trans, at 12-14, 16) 
After Fanari retrieved his license and the rental papers and 
handed them to Avery, Avery continued to question Fanari about his 
travel plans. Avery noted in the rental papers that the Lincoln 
was to be returned to the agency in Las Vegas. On cross-
examination the trooper conceded that a person can rent a car in 
one city, and then pay a drop charge if he chooses to return it in 
another city. Reviewing the rental agreement, Avery thought it 
suspicious that Fanari had put 1,100 miles on the car since taking 
possession of it. (Trans, at 17-20) 
Avery then returned to his patrol car to request dispatch to 
run a computer check on Fanari. The record does not indicate that 
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Avery asked dispatch to check the car registration, nor does the 
record indicate that Avery took this opportunity to prepare a 
citation for improper lane travel. (Trans, at 21-22) 
While Avery was waiting for the warrants check from dispatch, 
Trooper Lance Bushnell pulled up to assist. Dispatch informed 
Avery that Fanari had a prior criminal record out of New Jersey. 
(Trans, at 21-22) 
Avery then asked Bushnell to talk to Fanari. Bushnell had 
Fanari get out of the Lincoln and then tested Fanari for 
convergence of the eyes. Bushnell concluded that Fanari exhibited 
a lack of convergence, and Avery testified that lack of convergence 
is an indicator of drug use. Bushnell then put Fanari in 
Bushnell's police car. Avery testified he could not remember 
whether he or Bushnell requested Fanari to perform any other field 
tests to determine impairment. (Trans, at 22-24) Moreover, the 
officers never requested a blood or urine sample to determine if 
Fanari was DUI nor was Fanari cited for that offense. 
At some point, Avery resumed his conversation with Fanari and 
asked him if he had any criminal history. Fanari replied he had a 
previous marijuana charge in New Jersey. Avery testified that 
during this conversation Fanari, who was sitting in Bushnell's car, 
was not free to leave. Avery asked Fanari if Fanari had any drugs 
in the car. Fanari replied that he did not. Avery then asked 
permission to search the Lincoln and Fanari refused to consent. 
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Avery asked to search the trunk and Fanari again refused his 
permission. (Trans, at 24-25) 
Then Avery asked Fanari what was in the trunk, and Fanari 
replied that that is where he carried his garment bag. Avery 
observed that Fanari had shirts and slacks hanging in the back 
window. Avery also noted that a few air fresheners were in the 
back seat of the rented Lincoln. (Trans, at 25-27) 
Avery and Bushnell then called for a drug detection dog to be 
brought out from Gunnison, Utah. At this point, Avery still had 
Fanari's license and rental agreement. The dog and the dog's 
handler arrived about fifteen minutes after the call went out, and 
a search of the trunk then revealed a quantity of marijuana. 
(Trans, at 5, 28-29) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, Trooper Avery did not have reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to believe that Fanari had violated a traffic law. 
The trooper observed a single incident in which Fanari crossed the 
fog line on the right-hand side of the highway. This occurred on 
a windy day and Fanari was travelling behind an eighteen-wheeler. 
Accordingly, he did not violate Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61 which 
directs that a vehicle "shall be operated as nearly as practical 
entirely within a single lane . . . " Hence the traffic stop 
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. 
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Second, even if the stop was permissible under the 
Constitution, the subsequent detention ran afoul of the fourth 
amendment since the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion that 
more serious criminal activity was afoot. The facts available to 
the trooper consisted of Fanari's travel itinerary, the fact that 
Fanari was nervous, and thread-bare information about criminal 
history in New Jersey. These facts did not constitute reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Fanari was carrying drugs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Erroneous Findings of Fact 
There is no record evidence to support the following factual 
findings made by the trial judge: 
1. Contrary to the Findings of Fact signed by the trial 
judge (R. at 60) , the record evidence does not support the 
statement that Fanari "acknowledged he had been weaving." Instead, 
Trooper Avery's testimony was more equivocal on this point. The 
officer testified that Fanari "said something about he thought he 
might have been weaving because of the wind." (Trans, at 12) 
2. Contrary to the Findings of Fact signed by the trial 
judge (R. at 60) , there is no record evidence indicating that 
Fanari could not remember which airline he took to Las Vegas. 
3. Contrary to the Findings of Fact signed by the trial 
judge (R. at 60) , there is no reliable record evidence that at the 
time of the traffic stop Fanari demonstrated indications of recent 
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drug use. According to Trooper Avery, Sergeant Bushnell told Avery 
that Fanari demonstrated a lack of convergence of the eyes. There 
is no record evidence that any other tests were given by either 
officer to determine if Fanari was impaired, and Fanari was never 
charged with DUI. Moreover, during the initial phase of the stop, 
Avery did not ask Fanari whether Fanari had recently consumed 
alcohol or drugs, nor do Avery's actions remotely suggest that he 
or Bushnell were legitimately concerned about impairment. 
4. Contrary to the Findings of Fact signed by the trial 
judge (R. at 60) , there is no record evidence that a narcotics 
detection dog ever alerted on the trunk of the Lincoln. 
II. The trial court erred when it denied Fanari's motion to 
suppress since Trooper Avery did not have probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. 
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the stopping of 
a car by a police officer and the subsequent detention of the 
driver constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of those 
provisions even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653 (1979). 
Stopping a vehicle, or initiating a detention, is justified 
when the officer has "reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the 
influence of alcohol or driving without a license . . . " State v. 
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Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, the 
Utah Supreme Court recognizes three encounter levels between 
citizens and police: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop' ; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, the evidence received at the preliminary hearing 
demonstrates that the stop of Fanari's car was a level two 
encounter. A level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, occurs when the officer "by means of physical 
force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty11 
of a person. State v. Bean, 869 P. 2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980)). 
Because the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have abolished the pretext doctrine, a police officer may 
stop a car for very minor traffic or equipment violations. See 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). However, the key to 
justifying a stop under Lopez is that the officer must observe a 
traffic violation or have a reasonable basis to believe that a 
traffic offense has occurred. That test is not met in this case. 
Trooper Avery testified that he stopped Fanari's car because he saw 
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the Lincoln cross the fog line and move back to the center line. 
Avery stopped Fanari after only twenty to thirty seconds of 
observation, about three-quarters of a mile, and the trooper 
advanced no other justification for the stop. 
This driving pattern, in windy conditions and where the car is 
travelling behind a tractor trailer, does not constitute a 
violation of Utah law. The relevant traffic statute provides as 
follows: 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked 
lanes for traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as 
practical entirely within a single lane and 
may not be moved from the lane until the 
operator has determined the movement can be 
made safely. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-61 (1996) (emphasis added). 
Several appellate court decisions in both Utah and the Tenth 
Circuit have analyzed this statute or driving patterns strikingly 
similar to the one in this case. For example, in State v. Bello 
871 P. 2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this court concluded that a 
single incident of weaving was not sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion that the driver was impaired. The incident 
was a "minor driving aberration" that occurred under extreme wind 
conditions. 
The Tenth Circuit has been more prolific on the subject, given 
the large number of pipeline drug cases that are filed in federal 
district court. Thus in United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 974 
(10th Cir. 1993) , Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway 
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Patrol stopped a car after following it for about two miles. Over 
that two mile stretch, Mangelson saw the car "weave" three or four 
times within its lane of travel. Although the case was decided in 
the defendant's favor on the basis of pretext, a doctrine now 
abandoned, the court's reasoning would nevertheless apply to a 
reasonable suspicion analysis: 
We also believe Mangelson's admissions concerning the 
universality of drivers' "weaving" in their lanes and the 
commonness of people's avoiding eye contact with police 
officers while driving significantly undercut the 
rationality of using these factors as objective reasons 
for the legitimacy of the stop. Indeed, if failure to 
follow a perfect vector down the highway or keeping one's 
eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a 
person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion 
of the public would be subject each day to an invasion of 
their privacy. 
Id. at 976. Further, Mangelson had admitted on cross-examination 
that the driving pattern did not violate Utah law. Id. at 975. 
The Tenth Circuit revisited the "weaving" factor in United 
States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996) . Sergeant 
Mangelson, who was also the officer in Lyons, again justified a 
traffic stop on the basis of weaving. The Gregory court reversed 
the district court's denial of defendant's motion. The court ruled 
that an incident of actually crossing into the emergency lane did 
not violate Utah law and the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion that a traffic violation had been committed or that the 
driver was fatigued or DUI. Id. at 978. The court supported its 
decision by citing Lyons, again noting the impossibility of 
following a perfect vector down the highway and warning of the 
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potential risk to the privacy rights of all drivers. Id. at 978-79 
(citing Lyons, 7 F.3d at 976) . Importantly, the Gregory court also 
observed that its interpretation of section 41-6-61(1) was entirely 
consistent with the interpretation of the statute given by Utah 
courts. Id. at 978 (citing Bello, 871 P.2d at 586). 
The court in Gregory reasoned as follows: 
We agree with the Utah court which noted that the statute 
requires only that the vehicle remain entirely in a 
single lane "as nearly as practical." . . . The road was 
winding, the terrain mountainous and the weather 
condition was windy. Under these conditions any vehicle 
could be subject to an isolated incident of moving into 
the right shoulder of the roadway, without giving rise to 
a suspicion of criminal activity. . . . Since the 
movement of the vehicle occurred toward the right 
shoulder, other traffic was in no danger of collision. 
These facts lead us to conclude that the single 
occurrence of moving to the right shoulder of the roadway 
which was observed by Officer Barney could not constitute 
a violation of Utah law and therefore does not warrant 
the invasion of Fourth Amendment protection. 
Id. at 978. 
Applying the preceding authority to the facts in this case, it 
is clear that the stop was illegal. According to Trooper Avery's 
own testimony, Fanari was driving on the interstate on a windy day 
and was travelling directly behind an eighteen-wheel truck. In a 
period of time lasting between 20 and 30 seconds, or about three-
quarters of a mile, the district court found that the Lincoln 
crossed the fog line and moved back to the center line. (R. at 59) 
The record does not indicate how far the car moved across the fog 
line nor is there any evidence that the tires crossed or even hit 
the center line. The record does not indicate that Fanari crossed 
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the fog line more than the single incident that Avery observed. 
Avery never cited Fanari for improper lane travel because Fanari 
did not violate the statute. Fanari's lane travel was "practical" 
under then-existing traffic and wind conditions. 
In sum, Avery did not observe a traffic violation and 
therefore federal and state law prohibited him from stopping 
Fanari's car. The stop constituted a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the district court should have suppressed all 
evidence later seized as fruit of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. 
United States, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963). 
III. The trial court erred when it denied Fanari's motion to 
suppress since Trooper Avery did not have reasonable 
suspicion to extend the scope of the detention after the 
stop occurred* 
Should this Court conclude that Avery lawfully stopped 
Fanari's car, nevertheless the trooper did not have reasonable 
suspicion to extend the scope of the detention beyond the time 
necessary to cite Fanari for the alleged lane violation. Avery did 
not have reasonable suspicion to suspect that Fanari was carrying 
drugs or that he was DUI. Accordingly, the extended detention was 
unlawful and violated Fanari's fourth amendment to be free from 
unreasonable seizures. 
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A. Avery did not have a reasonable suspicion that 
Fanari was carrying drugs. 
Under the constitutional standard articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court, "[t]he length and scope of the detention must 
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 
761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1968) ) . Once the reasons for the initial stop have been 
satisfied, the individual must be allowed to proceed on his way, 
and "[a]ny further temporary detention for investigative 
questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial 
traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal 
activity." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th 
Cir. 1988)); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
The issue, then, is what will constitute reasonable 
articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. This 
Court has defined reasonable suspicion as follows: 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, this 
court looks to the totality of the circumstances present 
at the time the officer decided to stop the vehicle. . . 
The officer must be able to articulate facts and 
inferences from these facts that would "'warrant a 
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
action taken was appropriate. Anything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based 
on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a 
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction." 
Bello, 871 P.2d at 587 (citations omitted). 
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As this section of the Brief will demonstrate, the 
circumstances relied upon by Avery to extend the detention were 
innocuous, and could only have created a "mere hunch" that more 
serious criminal activity was afoot. See State v. Lovegren, 829 
P. 2d 155, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (a hunch, without more, does not 
constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. 
Godina-Luna, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994). The factors relied 
upon to justify the detention are limited to the following areas: 
(1) Fanari's nervousness, (2) the circumstances surrounding 
Fanari's rental car and itinerary, and (3) the fact that Fanari had 
an arrest record in New Jersey. 
In this case, the factors relied upon to justify Fanari's 
further detention "describe a very large category of presumably 
innocent travellers, who would be subject to virtually random 
seizures were [a court] to conclude that as little foundation as 
there was in this case could justify a seizure." Reid v. Georgia, 
448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); see also State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 
1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding no reasonable suspicion 
existed because "[a]n innocent explanation" was easily provided for 
each factor relied upon by trial court); United States v. Lee, 73 
F.3d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[s]ome facts must be outrightly 
dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations 
as to be innocuous"). 
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1. Nervousness 
Trooper Avery observed that Fanari appeared nervous during the 
traffic stop and would not look the officer directly in the eye. 
Utah courts have stated repeatedly that nervousness does not 
raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying 
continued detention. State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181, 184 (Utah 
1987); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P. 2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(no reasonable suspicion where defendants were stopped for traffic 
violation, were nervous, and were not proceeding on most direct 
route); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(avoidance of eye contact can be afforded no weight in determining 
whether officer has reasonable suspicion); State v. Hewitt, 841 
P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Lovecrren, 829 P.2d at 158; 
see also United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(trembling hands did not give rise to reasonable suspicion); United 
States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879-880 (10th Cir. 1994) (unusual 
nervousness of driver and startled awakening and stiff demeanor of 
passenger did not justify detention). 
In Mendoza, the State advanced a slew of factors to justify 
the seizure: the Latin descent of the occupants of the car, the 
route of travel (northbound on 1-15) , the time of day, the time of 
year, the California license plates, the erratic driving pattern, 
and the nervous behavior of the occupants. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the above facts did not create reasonable suspicion, and 
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the court affirmed the order of the trial court suppressing the 
evidence. 
Mendoza is significant for two reasons. First, the case 
demonstrates that reasonable suspicion cannot be magically created 
by the sheer number of innocuous facts advanced to justify the 
seizure. A hunch is still a hunch. Second, citing authority from 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court addressed the issue 
of nervous behavior, concluding that "failure to make eye contact 
[as well as other nervousness indicators] can have no weight in 
determining if the officers had a reasonable suspicion to conduct 
an investigatory stop." Id. at 184 (citing United States v. 
Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
The case law is replete with fact situations where officers 
relied on nervousness to justify a detention. Time and again, this 
circumstance has been dismissed by the courts because nervousness 
can and does result from innocent conduct. Moreover, counsel is 
unaware of any case that endorses a distinction between nervousness 
in old people and nervousness in young people. This is merely an 
attempt to get in through the back door what will not go through 
the front. A traffic stop can create anxiety in drivers of all 
ages. The age distinction also ignores the fact that many older 
people suffer from Parkinson's disease, and trembling hands is a 
common manifestation of that condition. 
In State v. Hewitt, 841 P.2d 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
incident to a routine traffic stop for speeding, the driver 
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produced a valid license and rental agreement. Then the 
investigating officer began asking the driver about his travel 
itinerary, the lack of luggage in the car, whether he was carrying 
large sums of money, and whether he had any contraband in the 
vehicle. On appeal, the state conceded that the driver's nervous 
behavior did not provide the officer with requisite reasonable 
suspicion to further detain once the purpose of the stop was over. 
Id. at 1224. 
The same result was reached in Godina-Luna, where the court 
held that incident to a traffic stop the officer unlawfully 
detained the defendants after the purpose of the stop was over. 
The court held that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain the 
defendants where the defendants were nervous and they were not 
proceeding on the most direct route of travel (Salt Lake City to 
Chicago via Interstate 70) . 826 P. 2d at 655. Likewise, in State 
v. Schlosser, 774 P. 2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that no reasonable suspicion existed where the 
passenger was fidgety, he was bending forward in his seat, and he 
was turning to his side to look at the officer. The court stated 
that "[w]hen confronted with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for 
drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn 
to look at an approaching police officer." Id. Finally, the Tenth 
Circuit has noted the entirely "subjective evaluation" that an 
officer gives to an observation that a suspect appears nervous: 
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Nothing in the record indicates whether Agent Ochoa had 
any prior knowledge of Defendant, so we do not understand 
how Agent Ochoa would know whether Defendant was acting 
nervous and excited or whether he was merely acting in 
his normal manner. Rather, Defendant's appearance to 
Agent Ochoa is nothing more than an "inchoate suspicion 
or h u n c h " . . . . 
United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1458 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In sum, under the foregoing authority Fanari's apparent 
nervousness did not provide Trooper Avery with "a sufficient 
objective and particularized basis" to continue the detention. 
Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881. 
2. Rental car and travel itinerary. 
Fanari told Avery that he flew to Las Vegas, Nevada to visit 
friends and then rented the Lincoln while in Las Vegas. Fanari 
explained that he was travelling back to Colorado. Avery testified 
that according to the valid rental agreement Fanari had put over 
1000 miles on the car and the agreement indicated that the car was 
to be returned to the rental agency in Las Vegas. 
In this case there is no dispute that the valid rental 
agreement produced by Fanari was proof that Fanari was lawfully 
entitled to possess and operate the car.1 The sole issue, then, is 
whether Fanari's itinerary provided Avery with objective facts 
" [A] defining characteristic of our traffic stop jurisprudence is 
the defendant's lack of a valid registration, license, bill of 
sale, or some other indicia of proof to lawfully operate and 
possess the vehicle in question, thus giving rise to objectively 
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may be stolen." Fernandez, 
18 F.3d at 879. 
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sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Fanari was 
carrying drugs.2 
In State v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431, 436-37 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) , the defendants' nervousness coupled with alleged 
inconsistencies in their travel plans and the fact that they could 
not produce written authorization from the owner of the van to use 
the vehicle, did not justify the detention. In that case, the 
officer stopped the defendants on the interstate during the month 
of April. Responding to the officer's inquiry the defendants, who 
were from California, explained that they were on a fishing trip. 
The officer was suspicious because he did not see any cold whether 
gear or clothing in the car. The Robinson court reasoned, however, 
that 
The weight to be given the absence of any visible cold 
weather gear or clothing is also slight, since it does 
not objectively suggest that: criminal activity is afoot. 
Although it may reflect hasty or inadequate travel 
preparations, it is also consistent with he fact that 
most residents of the Bay area in California have little 
need to own cold weather clothing and gear and must rely 
on their cold weather hosts to provide it for them when 
they visit. 
Id. at 436. 
2
 Avery admitted on cross-examination that he did not believe 
Fanari was carrying firearms, but he could not explain what it was 
specifically about the circumstances of the stop that made him 
suspect that this was a drug case rather than a gun case. (Trans, 
at 26) It would appear that his suspicions were based on a mere 
hunch and inchoate speculation. See Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968) . 
20 
Travel plans were also at issue in Godina-Luna. Incident to 
a traffic stop on Interstate 70, the defendants explained to the 
officer that they were on their way from Salt Lake City to Chicago. 
The officer noted that this was an indirect route of travel, but 
apparently he did not ask the defendants why they had chosen that 
particular route. The court in Godina-Luna held that the indirect 
route of travel, and defendants' nervousness, did not raise a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 826 P.2d at 655. 
The Eight Circuit has analyzed the itinerary problem in United 
States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331 (8th Cir. 1994) . In Garcia, police 
first made a lawful stop of the defendants' vehicle. Then, based 
on information learned during the first stop, a second traffic stop 
was made. The court held that this information did not raise a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the stop was 
therefore illegal. The court summarized the facts as follows: 
(1) the driver and passenger were in a rented truck 
packed from bottom to top with furniture boxes; (2) 
despite the fact that one of the suspects they were 
moving to El Paso, Texas, the officer observed no luggage 
or clothing bags when he opened the truck during the 
first stop; (3) the driver's story about why he was going 
to El Paso was slightly different than the passenger's 
story, with the driver stating they were "moving to El 
Paso" and the passenger stating they were moving 
furniture to El Paso; (4) the driver had an El Paso, 
Texas, driver's license and the passenger gave an 
identification card which indicated he was from Mexico; 
(5) there was no explanation of why a person with an El 
Paso driver's license and [a] person with a Mexican 
identification card would be in Nebraska on an east-west 
interstate highway either for the purpose of "moving to 
El Paso" or moving furniture to El Paso; (6) a check of 
the El Paso Information Center computer established that 
the passenger had been arrested by the border patrol for 
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a firearms violation; (7) the driver and passenger at one 
point conversed in a foreign language which the officer 
assumed was Spanish; and (8) the officer knew that El 
Paso, Texas, is a source city regarding the entry of 
drugs into this country from Mexico. 
Id. at 34-35. It is plain there are a number of factual 
similarities between Garcia and the case at bar, such as the use of 
a rented vehicle, questions about itinerary, and some kind of prior 
criminal history. As for the itinerary, the court reasoned that 
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 [a] lthough it may be unusual to run across people transporting 
furniture from Nebraska to Texas, it does not indicate any criminal 
motive. Id. at 1335. The Garcia court summarized by recognizing 
the dangers of permitting serious intrusions into our fourth 
amendment rights based on no more than strained inferences 
developed from generalized facts, and warned that " [w] e are not 
empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the 
government can more effectively fight the war on drugs." Id. at 
1336. 
Finally, assuming merely for the sake of argument there was 
something unusual about Fanari's itinerary, Avery did almost 
nothing to diligently pursue the investigation so he could quickly 
dispel or confirm his suspicions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 686 (1985); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. The trooper did not 
ask how Fanari had put the mileage on the car when the car had been 
rented in Las Vegas. He did not ask Fanari why he was returning 
the car in Colorado when the agreement indicated it was to be 
dropped in Las Vegas. Avery did not ask whether Fanari had 
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originally intended to fly back to Colorado and if so why his 
travel plans had changed. The trooper demonstrated what appears to 
be a genuine lack of curiosity over circumstances that he claimed 
were of a very suspicious nature. The only inquiry he made was 
whether Fanari had driven to California (Trans, at 20), and Fanari 
said that he had not. The discussion about Fanari's trip to Las 
Vegas and the return trip to Colorado ended right there. (See 
infra, Section B, analyzing traffic stop cases where officers did 
nothing to either clarify or further investigate their expressed 
concerns that more serious criminal activity was afoot.) 
It is reasonable to conclude that, in the course of a proper 
investigation that recognizes both the interests of society and the 
fourth amendment guarantees of a detained individual, Avery should 
have asked Fanari for clarification.3 But he never gave Fanari the 
opportunity to do so. Perhaps Fanari and his friends travelled 
north to Reno or south to Arizona. Maybe Fanari did a significant 
amount of driving in Las Vegas. And in fact, at the time of the 
traffic stop he had put hundreds of additional miles on the car 
just since departing Las Vegas. 
The fact that Fanari stated that he was going to drop the car 
in Colorado, when the rental agreement indicated it was to be 
3
 A Tenth Circuit case also involving Trooper Avery is of 
interest here. In United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 
1994), the court concluded that Avery's questions regarding travel 
itinerary amounted to "a fishing expedition 'in the hope that 
something might turn up.'" Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. 
Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
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returned in Las Vegas, is likewise without any legal significance. 
Fanari was returning to Montrose, Colorado, located in the western 
part of the state. (Trans, at 18) He could have missed his flight 
and decided to drive back. Or perhaps he did not even have a 
return plane ticket and instead had planned to return the car to 
the agency office in Montrose and simply pay the drop charge. 
Again, Avery never bothered to ask. 
There are a number of innocent explanations that can be made 
for the so-called suspicious circumstances of Fanari's itinerary. 
The trooper, however, chose not to seek clarification. The trial 
court should have accorded no weight to Fanari's itinerary when 
deciding whether Avery had a reasonable suspicion that Fanari was 
carrying drugs. 
3. Criminal history. 
During the initial stages of the traffic stop Avery requested 
dispatch to run a computer check on Fanari. Dispatch indicated 
that Fanari had some kind of criminal record out of New Jersey. 
When asked about this, Fanari replied that he had a prior marijuana 
conviction. When taken alone or even in the aggregate with the 
other reasonable suspicion factors, Fanari's criminal history is 
not relevant to the reasonable suspicion calculus. 
Police cannot justify a detention based on a person's prior 
criminal record. Accordingly, "knowledge of a person's prior 
criminal involvement (to say nothing of a mere arrest) is alone 
insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion." 
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United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994). In 
Sandoval, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that " [i] f the law were 
otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record--or even 
worse, a person with arrests but no convictions--could be subjected 
to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at 
any time without the need for any other justification at all. Any 
such rule would clearly run counter to the requirement of a 
reasonable suspicion . ." Id. The court concluded it was 
improper to use Sandoval's earlier involvement in a hit-and-run 
incident and his 5-year-old arrest (but no conviction) for a 
claimed narcotics violation to justify a present violation of the 
drug laws. Id. See also Lee, 73 F.3d at 1040 (fact that 
defendants had "extensive" criminal histories did not amount to 
reasonable suspicion). 
Applying the foregoing to the facts in this case, Avery could 
not justify the detention based in whole or in part on Fanari's 
criminal record. The information Avery received from dispatch was 
that Fanari had a criminal record out of New Jersey. Apparently, 
dispatch provided no further details about Fanari's record and it 
was Fanari who then told avery about a prior marijuana conviction. 
Indeed, it appears that until that point Avery did not know whether 
Fanari had a conviction or merely an arrest. Moreover, and 
assuming the inquiry would be relevant, Avery did not know if the 
conviction was a felony or misdemeanor. He did not know how old 
the conviction was and whether it was for possession or 
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distribution, nor did the trooper do anything to discover this 
information. 
Accordingly, Fanari's criminal record did not provide the 
basis for detaining him to investigate a mere suspicion of criminal 
conduct that was unrelated to the narrow purpose of the initial 
stop. 
B. Avery did not have a reasonable suspicion that 
Fanari was DUI. 
Recognizing the simple truth that actions speak louder than 
words, reviewing courts will not hesitate to examine and critique 
police conduct that is wholly inconsistent with the legal 
justification advanced for the stop or detention. For example, in 
State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 586-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), a 
deputy sheriff saw a car fishtail while it was leaving the highway. 
The deputy then inspected the area on the pavement where this 
happened and concluded there were no hazards on the road. The 
deputy knew that the driver of the car had then stopped at a 
convenience store, but took no steps to investigate further. It 
was only later, when the deputy found himself travelling on the 
highway in the same direction as the car he had seen earlier, that 
the traffic stop was made. The court concluded that the stop was 
illegal because the deputy had abandoned his investigation and had 
no apparent intention of stopping the driver when the incident 
occurred. 
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Further, in Gregory the Tenth Circuit observed that although 
the trial court had denied the motion to suppress on an alternative 
theory that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver 
was impaired by alcohol or lack of sleep, the officer administered 
no field sobriety tests after he made the stop. 79 F.3d at 978. 
See also State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (officer's investigation 
did not support reasonable suspicion that car was stolen; officer 
did not ask about the registered owner nor did he check stolen car 
records) ; Lee, 73 F.3d at 1039 (deputy stated he was concerned that 
driver was sleepy or intoxicated, but he never asked driver if 
driver had been drinking; deputy instead asked if driver was 
carrying guns or drugs); Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158 (officer 
testified he suspected defendants were under influence of alcohol 
or drugs, but did not conduct field sobriety tests to confirm or 
dispel his suspicions). 
In this case, Avery did not testify that he suspected Fanari 
was impaired by drugs or alcohol. Sergeant Bushnell came to assist 
Avery, and Avery merely asked Bushnell to go talk to Fanari while 
Avery waited for dispatch to respond with the criminal history 
check. Avery never requested Fanari to perform field sobriety 
tests nor did he ask Bushnell to look for signs of impairment. On 
his own, Bushnell had Fanari step out of the car and perform an eye 
convergence test. Although he conveniently concluded that Fanari 
had recently used a controlled substance, it is significant that 
Bushnell did not request any other field tests. The standard 
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battery of field tests in a DUI investigation are the heel :: :oe 
test, the walk and turn test, and the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test. Bushnell and Avery did not ask Fanari to perform any of the 
three. 
During the detention Fanari refused to give his consent to a 
search of the trunk. Of course had the officers genuinely believed 
that Fanari was DUI they could have arrested him on that charge and 
searched the trunk pursuant to the inventory exception to the 
warrant requirement. The officers simply pay lip service to an 
unjustifiable suspicion that Fanari was impaired. The impairment 
suspicions simply operate as a pretext to impermissibly extend the 
scope of the stop. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Fanari requests 
this Court to reverse the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and remand the case so that he may move to withdraw his 
plea of guilty. n 
DATED this Q day of May, 1998. 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA 
Lawyers for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order on Motion to Supppress 
2. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
r> r v 
'36 OCT 28 P f i l 2 ^ 
DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY, UT$# R K ^ 
895 East 300 North 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Telephone: 801-896-2700 Fax: 801-896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARCO C. FANARI, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 961600100 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
Defendant made a Motion to Suppress after the preliminary examination had been 
conducted. The basis for the motion was the testimony offered by the arresting officer at the 
preliminary examination. 
The Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
The officer had an articulable reason to stop the defendant. The reason for the stop was 
improper lane travel. The officer articulated the reason for the stop in his testimony. Of 
particular significance is the officer's answer recorded on page 7 line 22 of the transcript, "No, it 
was going across the fog line, then back across...." 
After the vehicle was stopped, the officer engaged in a conversation and made 
observations about the defendant, the car in which he was traveling and the papers which the 
defendant gave to the officer at his request. The statement of facts given by the State in it's 
9610251.K 
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 961600100, Page -2-
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress is more accurate as a recapitulation of the 
officer's testimony at the preliminary examination. 
The officer's suspicion increased as time passed and as different observations were made. 
The officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances,. 
Mr. Brown is appointed as draftsman to prepare an appropriate order and to submit it to 
the Court for execution. The file is also referred to the clerk for a review of scheduling and the 
clerk is directed to contact counsel if any scheduling matters need to be handled. 
Dated this 2 > day of October, 1996. 
DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
zx 
On October ^~J'~7 1996 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M-nuil PHn peraon. F»Fax) Addressee Method (M=mafl. P=in person. F=Fax) 
Mr. R. Don Brown ^ Mr. D. Gilbert Athay V $ < L 
Sevier County Attorney Attorney at Law 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 43 E 400 S 
Richfield, UT 84701 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
7 l - * *>-*^r* - „ ^^J^SjslU\ st. X 
9610251.se 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Justice Complex 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-2675 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
vs. : 
MARCO C. FANARI, : 
DOB: 02/02/69 Case No. 961600100FS 
Defendant. : Judge David L. Mower 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence before the Honorable David L. 
Mower, District Court Judge, the State being represented by R. Don 
Brown, Sevier County Attorney, and the Defendant being represented by 
D. Gilbert Athay, Attorney at Law. 
The Court having considered the Defendant's Motion and having 
heard the evidence presented, now enters its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 3, 1996, at 11:00 a.m., Trooper Denis Avery of 
the Utah Highway Patrol observed a 1966 Lincoln traveling eastbound on 
Interstate 70 and noted that the vehicle was going across the fog line 
and then back across. 
'yji RJ 
CLERK ^  f'w^S 
Page 2--Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order 
State of Utah vs. Marco C. Fanari 
2. Trooper Avery stopped the vehicle, approached the vehicle 
and asked the driver for his driver's license and the rental papers 
inasmuch as the vehicle window indicated that it was a rental vehicle 
out of Nevada. 
3. While the documents were being located, Trooper Avery told 
the Defendant why he had been stopped and the Defendant 
acknowledged he had been weaving; however, he attributed the weaving to 
the wind. 
4. The Defendant produced a Colorado driver's license and a 
rental agreement which showed that the vehicle was rented in Las Vegas 
and was to be returned to Las Vegas. 
5. While the Defendant was looking for the registration, the 
Defendant advised that he had flown to Las Vegas and rented the vehicle 
to return to Colorado. 
6. The Defendant was uncertain as to which airline he used 
and the vehicle odometer was not consistent with the Defendant's 
statement regarding his travels. 
7. Sgt. Lance Bushnell, a drug recognition expert, came to 
the scene and advised that the Defendant demonstrated indications of 
recent drug use. 
8. A narcotics detection dog was called to the scene and 
immediately alerted on the trunk area of the vehicle. 
9. The trunk was opened and searched, revealing 255 pounds of 
marijuana. 
Page 3--Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The vehicle was lawfully stopped for investigation related 
to the traffic offense of operating a vehicle outside the designated 
lane of travel, Section 41-6-61(1), Utah Code Annotated, and possible 
driver impairment. 
2. The officer's observations and the Defendant's responses 
to questions produced reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was 
involved in criminal conduct. 
3. The search was lawfully conducted. 
O R D E R 
Having entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
DATED this / > day of October, 1996. 
DAyipj^: MOV 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that an unsigned, full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the sSfl - day of 
October, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South, #325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a signed, full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-
class postage thereon fully prepaid on the /5 " day of October, 
1996, addressed as follows: 
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South, #325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
